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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

FTC V. AT&T: BLACK MIRROR BROUGHT TO LIFE?

“The internet is the first thing that humanity has built that humanity
doesn’t understand, the largest experiment in anarchy that we’ve ever had.”
~ Eric Schmidt, Google, Inc., CEO 1
I. INTRODUCTION
The Netflix original series, Black Mirror, paints the grim picture of a nottoo distant future dominated by nefarious entities preying on the public through
the titular black mirrors we all carry around in our pockets. Equal parts
disjointedly surreal and horrifyingly familiar, Black Mirror features allegorical
stories of the dangers of the use and abuse of technology. The episode, The
Entire History of You, shows an alternate reality wherein every member of
society is equipped with a device that records their every memory, leading the
characters to obsess and degenerate over such memories. 2 Meanwhile, the
episode titled Nosedive, follows a protagonist obsessed with her rankings in a
fictitious social media platform, and shows how this obsession drives her deeper
and deeper into violent insanity. 3 While the world of Black Mirror is fictitious,
our own world is creeping ever closer to that dystopia.
Since revelations about the United States National Security Agency’s
PRISM program broke in 2013, internet data security is back in the forefront of
American attention. 4 While concerns over privacy in the age of technology are
by no means new, 5 the omnipresence of smartphones, satellite positioning, and

1. Jerome Taylor, Google Chief: My Fears for Generation Facebook, INDEPENDENT (Aug.
17, 2010, 11:00 p.m.), http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/googlechief-my-fears-for-generation-facebook-2055390.html [https://perma.cc/ZH2K-QXWP].
2. Black Mirror: “The Entire History of You,” NETFLIX (2016), https://www.netflix.com/
watch/70264856?trackId=14277283&tctx=0%2C2%2C7c920c67-db72-4bea-a6bb-1537767fc51a
-70464741 [https://perma.cc/34KB-49UP].
3. Black Mirror: “Nosedive,” NETFLIX (2016), https://perma.cc/34KB-49UP [https://perma.
cc/6XVW-YMFY].
4. Timothy B. Lee, Here’s Everything We Know About PRISM to Date, WASH. POST (June
12, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2013/06/12/heres-everything-weknow-about-prism-to-date/ [https://perma.cc/Q4C4-D5WP].
5. See Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-618, 102 Stat. 3195 (1988)
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2710(c)(1) (2012)); see also Stephen Advokat, Publication of
Bork’s Video Rentals Raises Privacy Issue, CHI. TRIBUNE (Nov. 20, 1987), http://articles.chicago
tribune.com/1987-11-20/entertainment/8703270590_1_video-rentals-video-stores-bork-opponent
[https://perma.cc/RQQ4-7W3Z].
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the ubiquity of companies (e.g., Google, Apple, Facebook) providing these
services, the PRISM revelations have raised new and concerning questions over
the privacy of all Americans. 6 This public concern is only compounded by the
fact that U.S. citizens are particularly vulnerable to data privacy incursions due
to the fact that there is no specified governmental agency charged with
protecting data privacy, as compared to the E.U.’s Data Protection Directive. 7
Indeed, such vulnerabilities have been exposed time and time again. In 2006,
Netflix hosted a contest called the Netflix Prize. 8 In the contest, Netflix released
100 million records of the supposedly completely anonymous ratings of movies,
offering a $1 million prize for anyone who could use this anonymous data to
improve Netflix’s movie recommendation algorithm. 9 However, a mere two
weeks after the data was published, researchers began reporting the startling ease
with which an online attacker might be able to pair this data to specific
individuals. 10 Using this data, the researchers were able to identify at least two
users to a statistical near-certainty, and were then able to see exactly what
movies these individuals watched, shedding light on their views on politics (i.e.,
Fahrenheit 9/11), religion (i.e., Jesus of Nazareth), and other social issues (i.e.,
Queer as Folk). 11 This breach of data security led to a class action suit and a
separate investigation by the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) against
Netflix. 12
Such cyber-security concerns were the elephant in the room during FTC v.
AT&T Mobility LLC. In this suit, the FTC, the de facto federal agency for
prosecuting invasions of internet privacy, 13 brought suit against AT&T for
unlawfully deceptive business practices of “data throttling.” 14 Near the
beginning of the smart phone boom in the mid-2000s, AT&T offered a deal for
unlimited data usage in contrast to many of the usual usage contracts that had a
set limit of data the customer could use before incurring overage charges. 15
AT&T eventually changed its business model to eliminate this offering, but
allowed current plan members to be “grandfathered into” it, allowing them to
6. See Lee, supra note 4.
7. See Liane Colonna, Prism and the European Union’s Data Protection Directive, 30 J.
MARSHALL J. INFO. TECH. & PRIVACY L. 227, 228 (2013).
8. Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of
Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1720 (2010).
9. Id.
10. Id. at 1721.
11. Id. at 1722.
12. Steve Lohr, Netflix Cancels Contest Plans and Settles Suit, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 12, 2010,
2:46 PM), https://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/03/12/netflix-cancels-contest-plans-and-settlessuit/ [https://perma.cc/U6WL-QTPE].
13. Steven Hetcher, The De Facto Federal Privacy Commission, 19 J. MARSHALL J.
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 109, 109 (2000).
14. FTC v. AT & T Mobility LLC, 835 F.3d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 2016).
15. Id.
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keep their unlimited plan ad infinitem. 16 However, many “unlimited” customers
reported drastic decreases in mobile data speeds the more data they used. 17 The
FTC brought suit against AT&T alleging that its practice of data throttling these
customers with supposed “unlimited” data constituted a deceptive business
practice that the FTC is empowered to redress. 18 While AT&T originally
claimed that this data throttling was to protect its network from overstress at
peak usage hours, the FTC debunked this claim based on data showing that the
data throttling had no correlation with the overall data usage of AT&T’s
network. 19
The FTC brought suit in the district court in California, and AT&T moved
to dismiss, claiming it fell under the common carrier exception to the FTC’s
regulatory powers. 20 After the district court denied AT&T’s motion to dismiss,
the cell provider got leave to appeal directly to the Ninth Circuit. 21 The issue on
appeal was whether or not AT&T qualified for an exception to the broad
regulatory powers granted to the FTC in Section 5 of the FTC Act 22 because it
is a “common carrier.” 23 The court noted the frustratingly vague definition (or
lack thereof) of common carrier in the statute and therefore had to determine
whether common carrier status was based on the activity being carried out or
based on the overall activities of the company. 24
The FTC argued that the common carrier exception was based on the
activity, and so AT&T would not be considered as such, as its mobile data
service did not constitute a common-carrier activity. 25 However, AT&T
countered that the common carrier exception was based on the status of the
company, and so if it operated a single common carrier activity, then the whole
company should be classified as a common carrier. 26 Thus the essential issue for
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. FTC v. AT & T, 835 F.3d at 995–96.
19. Id. at 995.
20. Id. at 996.
21. Id.
22. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (2012):
The Commission is hereby empowered and directed to prevent persons, partnerships, or
corporations, except banks, savings and loan institutions described in section 57a(f)(3) of
this title, Federal credit unions described in section 57a(f)(4) of this title, common carriers
subject to the Acts to regulate commerce, air carriers and foreign air carriers subject to part
A of subtitle VII of title 49, and persons, partnerships, or corporations insofar as they are
subject to the Packers and Stockyards Act, 1921, as amended, except as provided in section
406(b) of said Act, from using unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce and
unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.
(citations omitted).
23. FTC v. AT & T, 835 F.3d at 997.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 997–98.
26. Id. at 997.
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the Ninth Circuit panel was to determine whether the designation of common
carrier was based on the activity engaged in or based on the status of the
company.
Because common carrier is not defined in the statute, the Ninth Circuit
applied canons of construction and examined the legislative history of the FTC
Act to determine whether the 1914 Congress intended the common carrier
exemption to be based on status or activity. 27 The court noted that the exception
is surrounded in the statute by institutions like banks and credit unions that are
status-based. 28 The Ninth Circuit also observed that courts presume that
Congress is aware of past judicial interpretations and practices, and assert that
Congress would have been more explicit if it wished to change this interpretation
of the common carrier exception. 29
The court also derived significant guidance from the Packers and Stockyards
exemption in Section 5. 30 The court noted that the Packers and Stockyards
exemption exempts entities “insofar as they are subject to the Packers and
Stockyards Act.” 31 The court reasoned, therefore, that by withholding this
“insofar as” language from the common carrier exception, the 1914 Congress
signaled that the exception was status-based. 32 Given these arguments, the court
held the statute conveys a status-based definition of common carrier, and so it
would be inappropriate for the courts to legislate around the statute. 33 The court
summarily reversed the lower court and remanded for dismissal. 34 However,
recently, the Ninth Circuit has granted the FTC’s motion for rehearing en banc,
agreeing to hear the case in a one-page opinion. 35
This decision by the Ninth Circuit panel in FTC v. AT&T has established an
unconscionable loophole for companies like AT&T, Apple, Google, and
Facebook to avoid any regulation concerning their use of consumer data.
Without FTC oversight, these companies, many of whom have already been
disciplined for violating user privacy, will be beyond the regulatory powers of
any government agency. This lack of supervision will beg for abuse. The FTC
has long been the government agency responsible for regulating internet privacy,
and by robbing it of this power, the Ninth Circuit has left a terrifying regulatory

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 998.
FTC v. AT & T, 835 F.3d at 998.
Id. at 999.
15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (2012).
FTC v. AT & T, 835 F.3d at 999.
Id. at 999, 1002.
Id. at 999, 1003.
Id. at 1003.
FTC v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 864 F.3d 995, 995 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc).
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gap that will be abused by companies that have shown time and time again their
willingness to skirt the rules of data privacy. 36
In this Note, I will argue that the Ninth Circuit sitting en banc should affirm
the ruling of the district court, negating the decision of the appellate panel.
Failing that, Congress must act to empower another federal agency to regulate
the use of data by AT&T and other internet “superpowers,” such as Apple,
Google, Verizon, and Facebook, who will be shielded from any meaningful
regulatory oversight by the panel’s decision.
In Part II, I will trace the well-established rights and powers of the FTC in
performing the duties of the federal government’s privacy watchdog. In Part III,
I will make the case as to why it is imperative that the United States has strong
regulation of internet privacy in light of the immense power wielded by entities
like AT&T. In Part IV, I will discuss problems with the Ninth Circuit panel’s
decision, and in Part V, I will provide solutions to the massive regulatory gap
established by the Ninth Circuit’s decision if the decision stands and the
Supreme Court does not take up the case.
II. THE FTC’S LONG-STANDING POSITION AS AN INTERNET PRIVACY
REGULATOR
One of the main reasons that the decision in FTC v. AT&T concerns so many
legal scholars is that it overturns over twenty years of the established practice of
the FTC acting as the federal government’s privacy regulator. By stripping the
FTC of this power, the Ninth Circuit has left these internet superpowers, who
are the biggest aggregators of private and sensitive information, without anyone
to hold them accountable.
Established by the FTC Act in 1914, the FTC was established with broad
consumer protection powers at the height of the anti-trust regulation period in
the early twentieth century. 37 The powers granted to the FTC were expanded in
the following years to combat new types of consumer abuse, culminating with
the Wheeler-Lea Amendment of 1938. 38 The Wheeler-Lea Amendment,
pertinently, established the FTC’s powers described in Section 5, empowering
the Commission to “prevent persons, partnerships, or corporations . . . from
using unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce and unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.” 39
However, as the digital economy began taking off in the late 1990s and early
2000s, the FTC began policing improper trade of private information, relying on

36. See Cases and Proceedings, FTC, https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings
[https://perma.cc/5ANN-KN49].
37. See Our History, FTC, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/our-history [https://perma.cc/PX89TGP2].
38. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (2012).
39. Id.
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its powers in Section 5. 40 Contrary to some critics’ suppositions, the FTC was
not engaging in a “power grab,” but indeed was filling an exigent need within
the executive branch. 41 Congress explicitly ratified the FTC’s use of Section 5
in this manner by explicitly delegating privacy-related powers to the FTC
through acts of Congress such as the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act
and the CAN-SPAM Act of 2003. 42
To better equip itself for its emerging role as a privacy watchdog, the FTC
has established a Division of Privacy and Identity Protection (“DPIP”) with the
sole purpose of exercising the FTC’s privacy regulatory powers. 43 DPIP
employs forty-six full-time employees whose only job is to “focus on direct law
enforcement and compliance” dealing with privacy and identity protection. 44
Furthermore, the FTC has five full-time employees dedicated entirely to mobile
privacy. 45 This expansion shows not only that the FTC has been designated as
the central federal privacy regulator, but also that such regulation is becoming
more and more vital as American consumers trust companies with more and
more private information.
Indeed, the FTC has put these privacy protection powers to use in recent
years. The FTC filed suit against Google a number of times in the last few years
for deceptive practices and irresponsible actions taken with consumers’ personal
information. 46 One of the most pertinent of these suits charged Google with
40. Press Release, FTC Sues Failed Website, Toysmart.com, for Deceptively Offering for Sale
Personal Information of Website Visitors, FTC (July 10, 2010), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/
press-releases/2000/07/ftc-sues-failed-website-toysmartcom-deceptively-offering-sale [https://per
ma.cc/QH7A-UH4Z]; Press Release, Internet Site Agrees to Settle FTC Charges of Deceptively
Collecting Personal Information in Agency’s First Internet Privacy Case, FTC (Aug. 13, 1998),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/1998/08/internet-site-agrees-settle-ftc-charges-de
ceptively-collecting [https://perma.cc/3D2B-G5ZG].
41. Geoffrey Manne, Time for Congress to Stop the FTC’s Power Grab on Antitrust
Enforcement, FORBES (Dec. 20, 2012, 2:24 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/beltway/2012/12/
20/time-for-congress-to-stop-the-ftcs-power-grab-on-antitrust-enforcement/#ba423e51fc84
[https://perma.cc/K8WH-2WFE].
42. 15 U.S.C. § 6505 (2012) (“Except as otherwise provided, this chapter shall be enforced by
the Commission under the Federal Trade Commission Act.” (citation omitted)); see also 15 U.S.C.
§ 7706 (2012) (“[T]his chapter shall be enforced by the Commission as if the violation of this
chapter were an unfair or deceptive act or practice proscribed under section . . . 15 U.S.C.
57a(a)(1)(B).”).
43. Division of Privacy and Identity Protection, FTC, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/bureausoffices/bureau-consumer-protection/our-divisions/division-privacy-and-identity [https://perma.cc/
A4CD-FAJ5].
44. Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy,
114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 601 (2014).
45. Id.
46. Press Release, FTC Charges Deceptive Privacy Practices in Googles Rollout of Its Buzz
Social Network, FTC (Mar. 30, 2011), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2011/03/ftc
-charges-deceptive-privacy-practices-googles-rollout-its-buzz
[https://perma.cc/88L5-873Y];
Press Release, Google Agrees to Change Its Business Practices to Resolve FTC Competition
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deceptive practices in misrepresenting its privacy policy to users of its (shortlived) social media platform, Buzz. 47 In that case, Google deceived users by
using consumers’ personal information even when the users opted-out of the
service. 48 Google eventually settled these charges, agreeing to a consent order
that required Google to implement a comprehensive privacy program to protect
the privacy of consumers’ information. 49
Given the FTC’s unique role in law enforcement, its consent orders have
come to be viewed as a type of common law for privacy law enforcement. 50 In
the vast majority of cases, privacy enforcement complaints get dropped or settled
prior to judicial review. 51 Once these suits are settled, the FTC hands down a
consent order that contains a description of the improper behavior. 52 These
consent orders subsequently serve as a common law-esque collection of
guidance for other companies wishing to avoid FTC investigation. 53 In this
manner, the FTC has developed a sizeable common law to which commercial
entities can look for guidance, establishing itself as the proper agency to regulate
internet privacy.
The FTC was granted broad regulatory powers to be a “back stop” to the
many gaps inherent in the U.S.’s regulatory structure. 54 By specializing and
through specific grants of power from Congress in the area of internet data
security, the FTC has become the de facto privacy regulator in the United States.
The FTC must continue to be so, lest we risk massive gaps in regulation that will
be exploited by highly motivated businesses and individuals.

Concerns in the Markets for Devices Like Smart Phones, Games and Tablets, and in Online Search,
FTC (Jan. 3, 2013), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2013/01/google-agreeschange-its-business-practices-resolve-ftc [https://perma.cc/68LB-RND3]; Press Release, Google
Will Pay $22.5 Million to Settle FTC Charges It Misrepresented Privacy Assurances to Users of
Apple’s Safari Internet Browser, FTC (Aug. 9, 2012), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-re
leases/2012/08/google-will-pay-225-million-settle-ftc-charges-it-misrepresented [https://perma.cc
/5TSY-TZRR].
47. Press Release, FTC Charges Deceptive Privacy Practices in Google’s Rollout of Its Buzz
Social Network, supra note 46.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Solove & Hartzog, supra note 44, at 607.
51. Id. at 610–11 (only 1 of the over 170 privacy related complaints charged by the FTC has
drawn a judicial opinion).
52. Id. at 610.
53. Id.
54. See FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316, 320–21 (1966) (“[T]he Commission has broad
powers to declare trade practices unfair. This broad power of the Commission is particularly well
established with regard to trade practices which conflict with the basic policies of the Sherman and
Clayton Acts even though such practices may not actually violate these laws.”).
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III. THE PERILS OF NON-REGULATION
By ruling that the common carrier exception is status-based, the Ninth
Circuit panel has established a truck-sized loophole through which internet
superpowers can avoid any federal oversight of their handling of consumers’
sensitive information. By the Ninth Circuit’s logic, if any superpowers offer or
acquire any common carrier service, such as telecommunication services, then
the entirety of their business is untouchable by any current regulatory force.
Indeed, many of these internet superpowers might already be able to take
advantage of such a loophole.
Internet superpowers have recently begun offering or acquiring
telecommunication services that would likely confer common carrier activity
status under judicial scrutiny. Google’s “Google Fiber” would likely be
considered a common carrier service, and Verizon’s recent acquisitions of AOL
and Yahoo would likewise absolve it of any oversight. 55 Furthermore, it would
seem that Facebook could be poised to acquire such common carrier services as
part of its goal to “connect a billion additional people to the internet.” 56 With
such a massive loophole looming, these tech giants could very easily engage in
covert surveillance of their customers. This begs the question: What is the worst
that can happen?
As Americans increasingly spend their time online, one would think that
they would be increasingly careful about privacy issues given the complex
nature of computers and the internet. However, a recent Pew Research Center
survey actually shows just the opposite. 57 In a survey conducted in 2014, ninetyone percent of adults admit that we have lost control over how personal
information is recorded and used by companies. 58 Eighty percent of adults say
that they are concerned about advertisers or businesses accessing information
gained through social networking sites. 59 Sixty-four percent say that the
government should do more to regulate these companies. 60 However, despite
these sentiments, there has not been any large public outcry protesting these
practices.
Meanwhile, businesses big and small have a massive interest in online data.
The collection and sale of consumer data by businesses has grown to be a
55. Brian Fung, How the World’s Biggest Tech Companies Could Wriggle Out of Privacy
Rules, CHI. TRIBUNE (Sept. 4, 2016, 8:00 AM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/bluesky/technolo
gy/ct-tech-companies-privacy-rules-wp-bsi-20160904-story.html
[https://perma.cc/6QWX-FS
H3].
56. Id.
57. Mary Madden, Public Perceptions of Privacy and Security in a Post-Snowden Era, PEW
RESEARCH CTR. (Nov. 12, 2014), http://www.pewinternet.org/2014/11/12/public-privacy-percep
tions/ [https://perma.cc/KNP9-DCAB].
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
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multibillion-dollar industry, and indeed has been a cornerstone of Google and
Facebook’s success. 61 Companies routinely utilize such data sets to predict
consumer behavior and ensnare new consumers using these predictions. 62 This
shows that there is a clear and cognizable incentive for these companies to
maximize their use of consumer data to increase profits. One study on behavioral
advertising concludes that this use of consumer data is so central to a modern
digital economy “that a small number of companies have a window into most of
our movements online.” 63 And companies do not stop at merely gathering data
on what their consumers buy. Social reading programs allow companies to track
data concerning how users read web pages, tracking a reader’s behavior down
to a specific page that holds the reader’s attention. 64 Without a federal agency
empowered to stop them, these companies will have even more incentive to skirt
data privacy rules to get an edge over their competition.
In his article, The Dangers of Surveillance, Neil M. Richards contends that,
“our society lacks an understanding of why (and when) government surveillance
is harmful.” 65 Part of the danger, Richards asserts, are the laws themselves. 66
The only way that a citizen can challenge secret surveillance is when it is
discovered; and even then, courts often dismiss claims for lack of standing
because the harms produced are “too speculative.” 67 Meanwhile, against the
specter of terrorist attack, surveillance is often cast as a necessary evil to preempt
even greater harm. Richards contends that this is because courts cast surveillance
solely as a Fourth Amendment right, concerning crime prevention, as opposed
to a legitimate infringement on First Amendment rights. 68
One of the biggest dangers of unfettered surveillance is the suppression of
free thought and free speech, both fundamental rights enshrined in the First
Amendment. 69 Surveillance, and particularly an awareness of surveillance by

61. See DAVID KIRKPATRICK, THE FACEBOOK EFFECT 259–67 (2010); STEVEN LEVY, IN THE
PLEX: HOW GOOGLE THINKS, WORKS, AND SHAPES OUR LIVES 262–63, 336–37 (2011).
62. Charles Duhigg, How Companies Learn Your Secrets, N.Y. TIMES, (Feb. 16, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/magazine/shopping-habits.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2017)
(discussing the tactics Target employs to ensnare highly desirable demographics).
63. Chris Jay Hoofnagle, et al., Behavioral Advertising: The Offer You Cannot Refuse, 6
HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 273, 279 (2012).
64. Neil M. Richards, The Perils of Social Reading, 101 GEO. L.J. 689, 698–99 (2013).
65. Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934, 1935 (2013).
66. Id. at 1934.
67. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 401 (2013).
68. Richards, supra note 65, at 1948. “The First Amendment protects public speech and the
free exchange of ideas, while the Fourth Amendment protects citizens from unwanted intrusion
into their personal lives and effects.” Id. at 1943 (quoting ACLU v. NSA, 493 F.3d 644 (6th Cir.
2007)).
69. Richards likens internet surveillance to the theory of the Panopticon, whereby a prison can
be designed around a central guard tower so all inmates could be theoretically watched at all times.
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the watched party, leads to chilling effects in speech and even thought. 70 In the
United States, this phenomenon has led to robust protections of the First
Amendment by the Supreme Court. In a now classic dissent, Justice Holmes
wrote that “the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted
in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which
their wishes safely can be carried out.” 71 In Whitney v. California, Justice
Brandeis captured the spirit of free thought when he wrote:
Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the state was
to make men free to develop their faculties, and that in its government the
deliberative forces should prevail over the arbitrary. They valued liberty both as
an end and as a means. They believed liberty to be the secret of happiness and
courage to be the secret of liberty. They believed that freedom to think as you
will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and
spread of political truth. . . . 72

Beyond the civil rights arguments against mass data gathering lies strong
scientific evidence showing significant threats to the mental and physical health
of those being watched. The scientific community has long known that
surveillance leads to stress, fatigue, and anxiety. 73 However, these negative
effects are magnified by the negative effects of constrained thought. In a series
of now classic social psychology experiments, psychologist Solomon Asch
demonstrated the massive power surveillance has to force conformity, even
when the majority is clearly in the wrong. 74 Such research has upsetting
implications in and of itself; however, when combined with superpower internet
communication providers wielding unfettered surveillance powers, the ability to

Richards, supra note 65, at 1948. This theory is one of the fundamental themes used in George
Orwell’s novel, 1984, (First Signet Classic 1977) (1949).
70. See, e.g., DAVID LYON, SURVEILLANCE STUDIES: AN OVERVIEW 115 (2007); Lilian
Mitrou, The Impact of Communications Data Retention on Fundamental Rights and Democracy—
the Case of the EU Data Retention Directive, in SURVEILLANCE AND DEMOCRACY 127, 129 (Kevin
D. Haggerty & Minas Samatas eds., 2010); see also Graham Sewell & James R. Barker, Neither
Good, Nor Bad, but Dangerous: Surveillance as an Ethical Paradox, in THE SURVEILLANCE
STUDIES READER 354, 357 (Sean P. Hier & Joshua Greenberg eds., 2007).
71. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919).
72. 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927).
73. Emina Subašić, et al., Leadership, Power and the Use of Surveillance: Implications of
Shared Social Identity for Leaders’ Capacity to Influence, 22 LEADERSHIP QUARTERLY 170, 171
(2011), http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1048984310001943 (last visited Feb. 2,
2017)
74. Saul McLeod, Asch Experiment, SIMPLY PSYCHOLOGY (2008), http://www.simplypsy
chology.org/asch-conformity.html [https://perma.cc/XW5K-D8FH]. In this experiment, Asch
invited subjects to participate in a “vision test,” wherein other people in the vision test, who were
in on the experiment, intentionally gave wrong answers when asked. In these experiments, nearly
seventy-five percent of subjects conformed to their peers’ incorrect answers. Id.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2018]

FTC V. AT&T: BLACK MIRROR BROUGHT TO LIFE?

495

induce conformity begins looking disturbingly like a new episode of Black
Mirror.
“If you have something that you don’t want anyone to know, maybe you
shouldn’t be doing it in the first place.” 75 This is not a quote from George
Orwell’s 1984, but instead from former Google CEO, Eric Schmidt, in an
interview with CNBC. 76 Although this “nothing to hide, nothing to fear”
argument has been debunked and disproven time and time again, 77 it remains
pervasive because Americans, by and large, have yet to grasp the importance of
internet privacy. 78 This same argument will prove to be fertile ground for abuse
if there is no government agency to protect them.
Although not explicit in its opinion, the Ninth Circuit panel has turned a
blind eye to the unrestricted and unregulated use of personally identifying
information as a result of their decision. This abdication of the court’s inherent
power to strike down unconstitutional laws is at best cowardly and at worst
intentionally exposing the American public to mass surveillance like never
before. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit sitting en banc should invalidate the panel’s
decision and affirm the district court’s preservation of the FTC’s role as privacy
regulator.
IV. WHY THE NINTH CIRCUIT GOT IT WRONG
In a scant ten pages in their August decision, the Ninth Circuit gave internet
superpowers within their jurisdiction carte blanche with which to avoid any
regulation of their handling of sensitive customer data. While the Ninth Circuit
focused its analysis on principles of statutory interpretation of the FTC Act, it
myopically turned a blind eye to broader concerns championed by the FTC’s
complaint.
A.

The Traditional Purpose of a Common Carrier

The only defense put forward by AT&T is the affirmative defense that it is
outside of the FTC’s jurisdiction due to the common carrier exception in Section

75. Google CEO on Privacy (VIDEO): ‘If You Have Something You Don’t Want Anyone To
Know, Maybe You Shouldn’t Be Doing It,’ HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 18, 2010, 5:12 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/12/07/google-ceo-on-privacy-if_n_383105.html [https://per
ma.cc/LND9-VSC3].
76. Id. Eric Schmitt later blacklisted CNET.com who published personal information of his
own in response. See Jennifer Westhoven, CNET: We’ve Been Blackballed by Google, CNN (Aug.
5, 2005, 6:15 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2005/08/05/technology/google_cnet/ [https://perma.cc/
PG93-57W3].
77. See, e.g., Alex Abdo, You May Have ‘Nothing to Hide’ but You Still Have Something to
Fear, ACLU (Aug. 2, 2013, 10:17 AM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/you-may-have-nothing-hideyou-still-have-something-fear [https://perma.cc/ZD9K-FEHD].
78. As pointed out by many scholars, this argument does nothing to justify its position, but
instead asks the opposition to justify their position in the alternative.
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5 of the FTC Act. 79 While many areas of the common law provide for special
rules for common carriers, it is unlikely, as suggested by AT&T and the Ninth
Circuit panel, that the drafters of the 1914 FTC Act envisioned mobile service
providers to be considered common carriers.
A long-standing feature of the common law, the common carrier doctrine
holds at its heart the notion that some businesses are subject to different rules
because they hold themselves out to the public for service. 80 In modern law,
common carriers are most often entities in the business of transporting people or
cargo. 81 According to the Restatement (Second) of Torts:
(1) A common carrier is under a duty to its passengers to take reasonable action
(a) to protect them against unreasonable risk of physical harm, and
(b) to give them first aid after it knows or has reason to know that they are
ill or injured, and to care for them until they can be cared for by others. 82

The purpose of establishing special rules for common carriers is to ensure that
they are using proper care as befitting a business holding itself out for use by the
public, and to avoid overburdening these entities to the point of discouragement
of such vital public service. 83 While it is apparent why special rules might be
needed for railroads, shipping companies, airlines, and other companies who
hold themselves out to transport physical property or people, it is less clear why
AT&T and other internet superpowers are allowed to invoke this classification.
Furthermore, the additional question arises as to why this classification should
allow such superpowers to avoid protecting their customers from unreasonable
harm, which is at the heart of the common carrier doctrine.
By extending the common carrier exception to the entirety of companies that
have some mobile data or telecommunication components, the Ninth Circuit
panel defeats the purpose of a common carrier exception in general. In choosing
to pursue a status-based definition of common carrier, the panel decision extends
full protection to portions of companies that have nothing to do with common
carrier activity. By way of analogy, such a rule is similar to absolving airlines
for deceptively advertising low fares that do not exist; however, the federal
government has taken in over twenty million dollars in three years in fines from
such deceptive practices. 84

79. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012).
80. Joseph H. Beale, Jr., The Carrier’s Liability: Its History, 11 HARV. L. REV. 158, 163
(1897).
81. 13 C.J.S. Carriers § 2 (2018).
82. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314(A) (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
83. Beale, supra note 80, at 163.
84. Hugo Martin & Sandra Poindexter, Unfair, Deceptive Practices Most Common Airline
Violation, DOT Records Show, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2014), http://archive.jsonline.com/business/
sometimes-airfares-are-just-too-good-to-be-true-b99320858z1-269750741.html [https://perma.cc/
R68T-UUR6].
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Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit’s ruling is in direct contravention of all
previous understandings of common carriers as used in the Federal
Communications Commission (“FCC”) and FTC Acts. In FCC v. Midwest Video
Corp., the Supreme Court explicitly stated that a cable system “may operate as
a common carrier with respect to a portion of its service only.” 85 Such rulings
reflect earlier cases dealing with railroads who were not subject to common
carrier protection when operating outside their common carrier duties. 86 It is also
important to note that the FTC Act, which gives the FCC supposedly
interlocking and complimentary authority to that of the FTC over common
carriers, also uses an activity-based definition of common carriers. 87 The
Telecommunications Act of 1996 states that a telecommunications carrier “shall
be treated as a common carrier under this chapter only to the extent that it is
engaged in providing telecommunications services.” 88 This explicit activitybased definition is a Congressional signal to codify the pre-existing
understanding of an activity-based definition of common carriers between the
FTC and FCC.
It is also important to point to the multitudes of previous FTC enforcement
actions that support the notion that the Section 5 common carrier exceptions are
activity-based, without so much as a peep of dissent from the courts. In one of
the very rare opinions issued in an FTC enforcement action, 89 the Tenth Circuit
supported broad regulatory powers for the FTC in its case against Accusearch
Inc. The court found that Accusearch Inc. violated consumer privacy by selling
its telephone records to third parties, holding “the [Federal Tort Claims Act
(“FTCA”)] enables the FTC to take action against unfair practices that have not
yet been contemplated by more specific laws.” 90 Furthermore, the FTC’s
enforcement actions resulting in consent agreements also point to the strong
need for broad regulatory powers, especially against companies that might
otherwise be considered common carriers, such as T-Mobile, Comcast, and
AT&T. 91 These enforcement actions would be disallowed by the Ninth Circuit’s
85. 440 U.S. 689, 700–01 n.9 (1979); see also McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Gen. Tel. Co. of
Cal., 594 F.2d 720, 724 n.3 (1979) (“A carrier may be an interstate ‘common carrier’ . . . in some
instances but not in others, depending on the nature of the activity which is subject to scrutiny.”).
86. See Santa Fe, Prescott & Phoenix Ry. Co. v. Grant Bros. Constr. Co., 228 U.S. 177, 185
(1913).
87. 47 U.S.C. § 153(51) (2012).
88. Id.
89. Solove & Hartzog, supra note 44, at 610–11 (“The FTC has issued over 170 privacyrelated complaints against companies. Yet virtually every complaint has either been dropped or
settled. Only one case has yielded a judicial opinion—FTC v. Accusearch Inc.” (footnotes
omitted)).
90. FTC v. Accusearch, Inc., 570 F.3d 1187, 1194 (10th Cir. 2009).
91. See Press Release, T-Mobile to Pay at Least $90 Million, Including Full Consumer
Refunds to Settle FTC Mobile Cramming Case, FTC (Dec. 14, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/news-e
vents/press-releases/2014/12/t-mobile-pay-least-90-million-including-full-consumer-refunds
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new rule, leaving millions of abused consumers without a remedy for their
grievances.
Furthermore, a common carrier exception protects carriers from their own
negligent wrongdoing, not their own knowingly deceptive practices. Comment
E of the Restatement summarizes the duties of common carriers as one of
“reasonable care under the circumstances.” 92 Therefore, it should be clear that
intentionally deceptive practices are unreasonable per se, and so are in
contravention of the fundamental purpose of common carrier protections. In this
case, AT&T’s deceptive practices are intentional actions taken that injure
consumers whose private information warranted common carrier protections in
the first place. 93 This is completely antithetical to the purpose of the common
carrier designation and cannot stand.
Therefore, the Ninth Circuit’s ruling goes against the long history of the
common law outlining the rights and responsibilities of common carriers.
B.

Privacy

The Ninth Circuit’s ruling not only turns a blind eye to the traditional role
and interpretations that common carriers have played in the digital economy, but
has also betrayed longstanding principles of privacy established in the United
States. Even 125 years ago, legal scholars were advocating for stronger privacy
rights, and the call to action from Justice Warren and Justice Brandeis in their
classic article, The Right to Privacy, remains hauntingly relevant to the issues
presented in this case. 94 There, the (soon to be) Justices wrote, “[r]ecent
inventions and business methods call attention to the next step which must be
taken for the protection of the person, and for securing to the individual what
Judge Cooley calls the right ‘to be let alone.’” 95

[https://perma.cc/8SQV-Z9QU]; see also Press Release, AT&T to Pay $80 Million to FTC for
Consumer Refunds in Mobile Cramming Case, FTC (Oct. 8, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/news-e
vents/press-releases/2014/10/att-pay-80-million-ftc-consumer-refunds-mobile-cramming-case
[https://perma.cc/SZT2-XDDT] (bringing charges against AT&T for deceptive “cramming” of
unauthorized charges on consumer bills); Press Release, DIRECTV, Comcast to Pay Total of $3.21
Million for Entity-Specific Do Not Call Violations, FTC (Apr. 16, 2009), https://www.ftc.gov/
news-events/press-releases/2014/12/t-mobile-pay-least-90-million-including-full-consumerrefunds [https://perma.cc/7S6V-M3SS].
92. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 1964).
93. FTC v. AT & T Mobility LLC, 835 F.3d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 2016).
94. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 196
(1890).
95. Id. at 195 (citing T.M. COOLEY ON TORTS 29 (2d ed. 1891). Justice Warren and Justice
Brandeis went on to say:
Instantaneous photographs and newspaper enterprise have invaded the sacred precincts of
private and domestic life; and numerous mechanical devices threaten to make good the
prediction that “what is whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed from the house-tops.”
For years there has been a feeling that the law must afford some remedy for the unauthorized
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Although the right to privacy is found in many areas of the law, a substantive
right to privacy for a person’s own actions has been vigorously advocated since
the end of the twentieth century and into the twenty-first century. One of the first
Supreme Court cases to rely on such a substantive right to privacy was Griswold
v. Connecticut, wherein the court held that the right to privacy protected a
couple’s right to use of contraception. 96 Since that decision in 1965, the Supreme
Court has regularly been called upon to further define the scope and outline of
this right to privacy of an individual’s personal decisions and information,
generally holding that the more intimate the information, the greater the need for
privacy. 97
Recently, the Supreme Court has grappled with a narrower element of a
citizen’s right to privacy in that citizen’s right to informational privacy. In the
fairly recent case of NASA v. Nelson, the Supreme Court suggested that the
storage and protection of personally identifying information was a matter of
constitutional proportions. 98 While the Court has not yet ruled establishing this
right against private companies, the Court has referred generally to a
constitutional privacy “interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters.” 99 It
is upon this basis that the FTC has established its privacy watchdog role.
However, the panel’s decision has effectively stripped the FTC of this
privacy watchdog role in direct contradiction of these Supreme Court rulings. 100
The FTC has already brought an enforcement action against Facebook for
abusing consumer privacy. 101 These actions, in addition to the actions against
Google discussed above, show that these internet superpowers have
demonstrated a penchant for abusing consumer privacy. 102
circulation of portraits of private persons; and the evil of the invasion of privacy by the
newspapers, long keenly felt, has been but recently discussed by an able writer.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
96. 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965).
97. See also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 565, 567 (2003); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
726, 727 (1973).
98. See 562 U.S. 134, 147 (2011) (“[W]e will assume for present purposes that the
Government’s challenged inquiries implicate a privacy interest of constitutional significance.”);
see also Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 439 (1977); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589,
591 (1977).
99. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599 (1977).
100. See Enforcing Privacy Promises, FTC, https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/mediaresources/protecting-consumer-privacy/enforcing-privacy-promises [https://perma.cc/VG3E-FY
YE].
101. Press Release, Facebook Settles FTC Charges That It Deceived Consumers by Failing to
Keep Privacy Promises, FTC (Nov. 29, 2011), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/
2011/11/facebook-settles-ftc-charges-it-deceived-consumers-failing-keep [https://perma.cc/86FW
-WRMT] (violating promises that it would keep consumer information private but allowing that
information to be widely shared).
102. Press Release, Google Will Pay $22.5 Million to Settle FTC Charges It Misrepresented
Privacy Assurances to Users of Apple’s Safari Internet Browser, supra note 46.
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However, it is not just the internet superpowers that need FTC oversight, as
large and small companies across the nation have succumbed to the temptation
of improper data usage. Perhaps most troublingly, the FTC brought suit against
the television provider VIZIO for secretly collecting viewing data from eleven
million consumers through its Smart TVs. 103 In this case, the FTC alleged that
VIZIO’s Smart TVs collected “second-by-second information” on what was
being displayed on the TV, from cable, streaming, and internet without any kind
of privacy disclaimer. 104 Meanwhile, in 2016, the FTC sued Practice Fusion, an
internet-based health records company responsible for handling highly sensitive
information for thousands of customers, for mishandling that private
information. 105
Given the growing volume of the FTC’s privacy actions, it is clear that there
is a need for strong privacy regulation in the United States, especially when
viewed in light of other areas of the law where privacy is already compromised.
However, in its ruling in FTC v. AT&T, the Ninth Circuit panel has given internet
superpowers free reign to use personal information in whatever manner they see
fit, in direct contrast to the constitutional interests in avoiding the disclosure of
personal matters.
C. Regulation Gap
In a world of complex corporate structures, how will this status
interpretation of common carrier apply to companies who engage in elements of
common carrier activities? What is the threshold of activity to be granted the
status of common carrier and thereby avoid FTC regulation? 106 Because the
United States insists on taking a piece-meal approach to data security, as
opposed to the more holistic approach employed by the European Union, we are
uniquely exposed to potential gaps in data security. Up to this point, the only
safety net for such policy gaps has been the powers of the FTC, and without
these, the American public is exposed. 107
103. Press Release, VIZIO to Pay $2.2 Million to FTC, State of New Jersey to Settle Charges
It Collected Viewing Histories on 11 Million Smart Televisions Without Users’ Consent, FTC (Feb
6, 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2017/02/vizio-pay-22-million-ftc-statenew-jersey-settle-charges-it [https://perma.cc/4XKN-X7VL].
104. Id.
105. Press Release, Electronic Health Records Company Settles FTC Charges It Deceived
Consumers About Privacy of Doctor Reviews, FTC (June 8, 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/press-releases/2016/06/electronic-health-records-company-settles-ftc-charges-it-deceived
[https://perma.cc/3JG4-SH98] (charging that the company misled users concerning whether their
sensitive personal and medical information would become public).
106. It is worth noting that the legislative history of the FTC Act intended to avoid tricky
definitions of the FTC’s power for fear of making it ineffective. See H.R. REP. NO. 63-1142, at 19
(1914) (Conf. Rep.) (finding that, regarding unfairness, “[i]f Congress were to adopt the method of
definition, it would undertake an endless task”).
107. See generally Solove & Hartzog, supra note 44, at 585.
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For obvious reasons, the FTC action against AT&T has attracted attention
from scholars across the nation, many of whom have submitted amicus briefs on
one side or another. One such brief, submitted by a collection of Data Privacy
and Security Law Professors, points to many regulatory gaps that would result
from allowing the panel’s decision to stand. 108 This brief points out the limits of
FCC regulation which AT&T argues is the intent of the common carrier
exemption in the first place. However, the FCC’s ability to regulate companies
like AT&T would be limited only to information gained “by virtue of its
provision of a telecommunications service” as proscribed in the
Telecommunications Act. 109 The amici curiae further point out that these
companies take in vast amounts of personal data from portions of their
operations that would not be covered by the Telecommunications Act, such as
their mobile data services, leaving regulation of such to “a largely unregulated
‘wild west,’ subject only to inadequate state law, enforced through class action
suits and circumscribed regulatory authority.” 110
The flip side of this rule is that while the FCC is empowered to regulate
common carriers, it is not empowered to regulate an activity that does not
provide telecommunications services. This would leave a regulatory gap for any
deceptive advertising or content services, unable to be prosecuted by the FTC or
the FCC. 111 These concerns are only magnified by a brief of amicus curiae
submitted in support of the FTC by the FCC itself. 112 In this brief, the FCC
argues forcefully that the panel’s ruling destroys the “cooperative and
complementary” roles played by each agency in protecting consumers. 113 The
FCC points to the FCC-FTC Consumer Protection Memorandum of
Understanding to argue that both agencies have long understood that the FTC
has jurisdiction over non-common carrier services of entities that also engage in
common carrier services typically overseen by the FCC. 114
Perhaps the most telling amicus brief filed in support of the FTC, however,
came from the last place anyone would expect: the internet superpowers
themselves. In an amicus brief filed by Charter, Comcast, Cox, and Verizon,
108. Brief for Data Privacy and Security Law Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner
at 9–21, FTC v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, 835 F.3d 993 (9th Cir. 2016) (No. 15-16585).
109. 47 U.S.C. § 222(c)(1) (2012).
110. Brief for Data Privacy and Security Law Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner,
supra note 108, at 13.
111. Id. at 3 n.1.
112. Brief for Federal Communications Commission as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner,
FTC v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, 835 F.3d 993 (9th Cir. 2016) (No. 15-16585).
113. Id.
114. Id. (quoting FCC-FTC Consumer Protection Memorandum of Understanding, at 2 (Dec.
17, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cooperation_agreements/151116ftcfccmou.pdf [https://perma.cc/PSR7-NWQL]) (“[T]he scope of the common carrier exemption in the
FTC Act does not preclude the FTC from addressing non-common carrier activities engaged in by
common carriers.”).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

502

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 62:485

these massive Internet Service Providers (“ISPs” and “ISP”) admit at the outset
that “[a]t first glance, amici’s position might seem surprising.” 115 However, the
amici go on to argue that “the important regulatory goals that are at stake in this
case cannot be achieved if the en banc Court accepts the panel’s
interpretation.” 116 Charter, et al. argue that “[t]he panel’s decision undercuts”
the regulatory need for consistency and expertise in enforcing consumer
protection laws. 117 These ISPs demonstrate admirable foresight in forecasting “a
cacophony of regulatory burdens that will harm consumers and businesses alike”
as a result of the panel’s decision. 118
Furthermore, the panel’s conceptualization of a status-based interpretation
of the common carrier exception calls into question precisely how many services
an entity must provide until it can claim the status of a common carrier. The
Ninth Circuit’s panel seemed cognizant of this problem in its opinion, saying
common carrier status would not extend to the “acquisition of some minor
[common carrier] division unrelated to the company’s core activities that
generates a tiny fraction of its revenue.” 119 Not only does this leave a vague
standard that will trigger heavy litigation, but it ignores the economic realities
of the companies affected. As discussed supra, internet superpowers like
Verizon, Google, and Facebook have begun acquiring significant corporate
players, contributing much more to the overall operations of the company, and
therefore avoiding the panel’s concerns of adding only a tiny fraction to establish
common carrier status. 120
The Ninth Circuit’s decision also establishes a circuit split with decisions of
the Second and D.C. Circuits. The Second Circuit fairly recently agreed with
almost the exact same argument put forward by the FTC in this case in FTC v.
Verity International, Ltd., 121 and the D.C. Circuit has long held that the term
“common carrier” is activities-based. 122 While it is proper for the circuits to
assert different views on the law, the vulnerabilities exposed by this particular
split warrant special consideration. Because most of the companies implicated
in the Ninth Circuit’s decision are national in scope, this loophole could likewise
be national in scope.
The regulation gap that results from the Ninth Circuit decision will not only
leave consumers vulnerable to abuse by these internet superpowers, but will also
disrupt the regulation of critical markets.
115. Brief for Charter Communications, et al., as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 3,
FTC v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, 835 F.3d 993 (9th Cir. 2016) (No. 15-16585).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 15.
119. FTC v. AT & T Mobility LLC, 835 F.3d 993, 1002 (9th Cir. 2016).
120. See Fung, supra note 55.
121. 443 F.3d 48, 56–61 (2nd Cir. 2006).
122. See Nat’l Ass’n of Regulatory Util. Comm’rs v. FCC, 533 F.2d 601, 608 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
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D. Statutory Interpretation
In addition to these wider policy arguments against allowing AT&T (and
similarly situated companies) to claim immunity for its deceptive practices as a
common carrier, the Ninth Circuit’s opinion is flawed in and of itself. The
opinion issued by the Ninth Circuit panel devotes the majority of its space to
discussing the statutory interpretive rules followed by the Circuit in finding the
common carrier exception as one concerning the “status” of the company, and
not the activity that the company is conducting. 123 However, the district court,
in ruling against AT&T, relied on a number of Supreme Court decisions that
held it is possible for companies to lose their protections as common carriers if
they engaged in activity that is “outside the performance of its duty as a common
carrier.” 124
In concluding that common carrier is an activity-based analysis and not a
status-based one, the district court made a convincing case of its own statutory
interpretation. 125 The district court pointed to the meaning of common carrier as
understood at the passing of the FTC Act in 1914 as one that includes the activity
in question. 126 The court also pointed to statements made by members of
Congress in debating the bill that suggests that activity should be a part of the
common carrier analysis. 127 Furthermore, the court noted that the FTC’s
interpretation of the Act was entitled to some deference per Skidmore v. Swift &
Co. 128 The Ninth Circuit disagreed with all of these points. 129
The panel cited to the established presumption that Congress is aware of
prior judicial interpretations of issues being legislated 130 to show that the bare
terms of common carrier was an intentional exclusion of the activity-based
interpretations found in earlier Supreme Court cases. 131 However, by this same

123. FTC v. AT & T, 835 F.3d at 998–00.
124. Santa Fe, Prescott & Phoenix Ry. Co. v. Grant Bros. Constr. Co., 228 U.S. 177, 185 (1913)
(“[T]his rule has no application when a railroad company is acting outside the performance of its
duty as a common carrier.”); R.R. Co. v. Lockwood, 84 U.S. 357, 377 (1873) (stating that a
company can become a private carrier when it “undertakes to carry something which it is not [its]
business to carry”).
125. FTC v. AT & T Mobility LLC, 87 F. Supp. 3d 1087, 1104 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
126. Id. at 1092.
127. Id. at 1094 (quoting Representative Stevens, a manager of the bill, who said: “They ought
to be under the jurisdiction of this commission in order to protect the public, in order that all of
their public operations should be supervised, just the same as where a railroad company engages
in work outside of that of a public carrier. In that case such work ought to come within the scope
of this commission for investigation. . . . [E]very corporation engaged in commerce except common
carriers, and even as to them I do not know but that we include their operations outside of public
carriage regulated by the interstate-commerce acts.”).
128. Id. at 1101 (holding “a non-controlling agency opinion may carry persuasive weight”).
129. FTC v. AT & T Mobility LLC, 835 F.3d 993, 999, 1002–03 (9th Cir. 2016).
130. Id. at 999.
131. Id.
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presumption, the proper interpretation of the FTC Act would be that Congress
was aware of such activity-based qualifications for common carriers, and by not
using explicit language to change this meaning, actually intended such
interpretations to remain concerning common carriers in Section 5 of the FTC
Act.
Given these glaring issues with the panel’s decision, the Ninth Circuit
should invalidate it by agreeing with the district court’s interpretation that
common carrier status is based on activity.
V. IF NOT THE FTC, THEN WHO?
Even if the courts decide that the common carrier exception established in
Section 5 of the FTC Act does prevent the FTC from holding AT&T accountable
for its deceptive practices, the legal arguments against such unaccountability still
remain. This begs the question, if the FTC, the government agency which is
widely considered to have the strongest regulatory powers in this area of
commerce, is robbed of its powers, who will be able to rein in these
technological superpowers and hold them accountable for bad behavior?
A.

The FCC

As indicated by AT&T itself in its brief in support of its dismissal motion,
the FCC seems to be the next logical agency to take on the mantle of regulation
of large internet-oriented companies. 132 The FCC’s privacy regulatory powers
are derived from Section 22 of the Telecommunications Act, which gives the
FCC power to regulate common carriers outside the reach of the current FTC
jurisdiction. 133
Furthermore, in recent years, the FCC has been making strides to become a
more powerful regulatory force concerning the internet. After adopting an order
establishing basic net neutrality rules, which were upheld by the D.C. Circuit in
a recent ruling, 134 the FCC has set itself up as a stronger regulatory force than in
the past. 135 Furthermore, as discussed by AT&T in its brief on the case, the FCC
has recently re-classified ISPs to be common carriers, bringing AT&T under its

132. Motion to Dismiss by Defendant AT&T Mobility, LLC, FTC v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 87
F. Supp. 3d 1087 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (No. 3:14-cv-04785-EMC), 2015 WL 462303.
133. 47 U.S.C. § 222 (2012).
134. Cecilia Kang, Court Backs Rules Treating Internet as Utility, Not Luxury, N.Y. TIMES
(June 14, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/15/technology/net-neutrality-fcc-appealscourt-ruling.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/K4NL-VB3S]. However, the current Trump
administration is pushing to repeal these rules. See Brian Fung, The Republican Push to Repeal Net
Neutrality Will Get Underway This Week, WASH. POST (May 17, 2017), https://www.washington
post.com/news/the-switch/wp/2017/05/17/the-republican-push-to-repeal-net-neutrality-is-gettingunderway-this-week/?utm_term=.6cfb59a42fc1 [https://perma.cc/F7DP-DYLP].
135. Kang, supra note 134.
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Section 202 jurisdiction. 136 However, many observers remain skeptical of the
FCC’s regulatory potency and its proposed policy’s effect on internet privacy.
One major critique of the FCC’s new proposed regulations is its failure to
address the sensitivity of information gathered. The FCC’s newly adopted rules
set out specific procedures based on the entity using the personal information
gathered by the ISP. 137 However, these rules do not address the sensitivity of the
information gathered, instead relying on boilerplate “opt-in” agreements
regardless of the situation. 138 These critics assert that consumers will blithely
opt into such usages as part of user agreements routinely clicked through by endusers today, potentially releasing highly sensitive data. 139
The court in FTC v. AT&T implies that the FCC would be able to fill the
massive gap in regulation made by its ruling; however, this is not the case. 140
The language of the Telecommunications Act, which governs the FCC, allows
the FCC to regulate telecommunication companies only insofar that they receive
information “by virtue of its provision of a telecommunications service.” 141
Given the panel’s demonstrated insistence on statutory language, it is unlikely it
would expand the Act’s language to allow “telecommunications service” to
include mobile data usage, and so the regulatory gap would remain without any
additional action taken by Congress.
B.

Congress

If the Ninth Circuit’s en banc ruling agrees with the panel’s doggedly
demonstrated deference to the legislature in interpreting Section 5, however, it
might become necessary to legislate around this loophole.
As demonstrated in FTC v. AT&T, while the FTC’s Section 5 common
carrier exception has good policy effects in the wider schema of the FTC’s
regulation of interstate trade, it is particularly harmful to the FTC’s more specific
task of privacy regulation. 142 Indeed, even FTC chairwoman Edith Ramirez has
urged congress to repeal the common carrier exception in its entirety to better
protect consumers. 143 Such a move has garnered support from both the FTC and

136. Motion to Dismiss by Defendant AT&T Mobility, LLC, supra note 132.
137. Protecting the Privacy of Customers of Broadband and Other Telecommunications
Services, 82 Fed. Reg. 44,118 (Sept. 21, 2012) (codified at 47 C.F.R. § 64) (2017), https://apps.fcc.
gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-16-39A1_Rcd.pdf [https://perma.cc/HC62-UBGG].
138. Rosemary C. Harold, The FCC Forgot Something in Piecing Together Its Unnecessarily
Complex Proposal for Broadband Privacy Regulation: Consumers, 17 FEDERALIST SOC’Y REV.
72, 77, 79 (Oct. 2016).
139. See id. at 77–78.
140. FTC v. AT & T Mobility LLC, 835 F.3d 993, 996, 1003 (9th Cir. 2016).
141. 47 U.S.C. § 222(c)(3) (2012).
142. FTC v. AT & T Mobility LLC, 87 F. Supp. 3d 1087, 1095 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
143. Prepared Statement of the Federal Trade Commission on “Legislative Hearing on 17 FTC
Bills” Before the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 114th Cong. 1, 8 (May 24, 2016),
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the FCC, and as such, a repeal would allow for better inter-agency cooperation
in service of consumer protection. 144 Legislation to repeal the common carrier
exception, introduced by Congressman Jerry McNerney, was referred to
committee in May 2016 145 and has the support of the FTC. 146
Such legislation would be consistent with the recent trend of increasing,
rather than decreasing, federal oversight of internet based companies. As the
internet has become a more dominant force in the world, Congress has legislated
to control it and protect citizens. 147 By adopting net neutrality rules, the FCC has
signaled its commitment to regulation of ISPs. 148 Legislation formally repealing
the common carrier exception would simply be the next logical step in internet
regulation.
VI. CONCLUSION
Life in the twenty-first century is, almost by definition, shaped by the
internet and rapidly advancing technology. With this characteristic comes
dizzying advancements in the fields of science, medicine, commerce, and
virtually any other industry in our lives. However, as Eric Schmidt, Google CEO
has said, it is important to remember that the internet is “the first thing that
humanity has built that humanity doesn’t understand.” 149 This uncertainty must
be treated with caution and healthy skepticism, lest we allow it to become a tool
of greed and oppression.
When the Ninth Circuit panel heard AT&T Mobility’s appeal in its case
against the FTC, it was not hearing a simple case of statutory interpretation. It
was hearing a case charged with much wider, generation-defining issues at play.
The panel failed to address privacy concerns. The panel failed to address
corporate manipulation concerns. The panel failed to address the outdated and

https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/950403/160524commtestimony17-bills.pdf [https://perma.cc/W79N-SSPE].
144. Brian Fung, How to End a Fight over Who Should Regulate Internet Providers, WASH.
POST (Mar. 26, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2015/03/26/couldthe-ftcs-inability-to-regulate-internet-providers-come-to-an-end/?utm_term=.d2d9e35fc7fd
[https://perma.cc/MJ6H-E24S].
145. Protecting Consumers in Commerce Act of 2016, H.R. 5239 114th Cong. (2016),
https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/5239/committees [https://perma.cc/T7
NT-SDP4].
146. BERIN SZÓKA & GEOFFREY A. MANNE, RESTORING CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF THE
SECOND NATIONAL LEGISLATURE, FTC 93 (May 2016), http://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF17/
20160524/104976/HHRG-114-IF17-Wstate-ManneG-20160524-SD004.pdf [https://perma.cc/W3
39-VKMC].
147. See 47 U.S.C. § 153(51) (2012).
148. Report and Order on Remand, Declaratory Ruling, and Order, FCC 15-24 (Feb. 26, 2015),
https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-15-24A1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7EKA-GC
ZB].
149. Taylor, supra note 1.
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outclassed language of a statute written over 100 years ago, clinging to that
language in the face of a period of the most rapid promulgation of technology
known to the human race. Because the Ninth Circuit panel that heard AT&T’s
appeal addressed none of these issues, the Ninth Circuit hearing the case en banc
must address these issues. If these issues are addressed, there is only one
conclusion: the Ninth Circuit must affirm the district court’s ruling, invalidate
the panel’s decision, and ensure that individual American citizens are not used
and abused by those lurking behind black mirrors.
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